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Abstract—We study the problem of safety verification of direct
perception neural networks, where camera images are used as
inputs to produce high-level features for autonomous vehicles to
make control decisions. Formal verification of direct perception
neural networks is extremely challenging, as it is difficult to
formulate the specification that requires characterizing input as
constraints, while the number of neurons in such a network
can reach millions. We approach the specification problem by
learning an input property characterizer which carefully extends
a direct perception neural network at close-to-output layers, and
address the scalability problem by a novel assume-guarantee
based verification approach. The presented workflow is used to
understand a direct perception neural network (developed by
Audi) which computes the next waypoint and orientation for
autonomous vehicles to follow.
Index Terms—formal verification, neural network, dependabil-
ity, autonomous driving
I. INTRODUCTION
Using deep neural networks has been the de facto choice
for developing visual object detection function in automated
driving. Nevertheless, in the autonomous driving workflow,
the neural networks can also be used more extensively. An
example is direct perception [2]; one trains a neural network
to read high-dimensional inputs (such as images from camera
or point clouds from lidar) and produce low-dimensional
information called affordances (e.g., safe maneuver regions or
the next waypoint to follow) which could be used to program
a controller for the autonomous vehicle. One may use direct
perception as a hot standby system for a classical mediated
perception system that extracts objects and identifies lane
markings before affordances are produced.
In this paper, we study the safety verification problem for a
neural network implementing direct perception, where the goal
is to ensure that under certain input conditions, the undesired
output values never occur. An example of such a kind can
be the following: “For every input image where the road in
the image strongly bends to the right, the output of the neural
network should never suggest to strongly steer to the left”.
Overall, the safety verification problem for direct perception
networks is fundamentally challenging due to two factors:
• (Specification) To perform safety verification, one
premise is to have the undesired property formally
specified. Nevertheless, it is practically impossible to
characterize input specifications from images such as
“road strongly bends to the right” and represent them as
constraints over input variables.
• (Scalability) Neural networks for direct perception often
take images with millions of pixels, and the internal
structure of the network can have many layers. This
challenges any state-of-the-art formal analysis framework
in terms of scalability.
Towards these issues, we present a workflow for safety veri-
fication of direct perception neural networks by simultaneously
addressing the specification and the scalability problem. For
the ease of understanding, we use Figure 1 to explain the con-
cept. First, we address the specification problem by learning
an input property characterizer network, where the input of
the network is connected to close-to-output layer neurons of
the original direct perception network. In Figure 1, the input
property characterizer takes output values from the neurons
n171 , n
17
2 , n
17
3 , n
17
4 and n
17
5 in the original deep perception
network. For the previously mentioned specification, the input
property characterizer outputs true if an input image has “road
strongly bending to the right”. By doing so, the characterization
of input features is aggregated to an output of a neural network.
Subsequently, the safety verification problem is approached by
asking if it is possible for the input-characterizing network to
output true, but the output of the direct perception network
demonstrates undesired values. As both the deep perception
network and the input-characterizing network have shared
neuron values, safety verification can be approached by only
verifying close-to-output layers without losing soundness. In
Figure 1, safety verification only analyzes the sub-network
colored grayed, and examines if any assignment of n171 , n
17
2 ,
n173 , n
17
4 , and n
17
5 leads to undesired output. The bounds
of the neurons n171 , n
17
2 , n
17
3 , n
17
4 , and n
17
5 can be decided
by static analysis (which guarantees an overly conservative
bound). However, using such a bound allows to have input
images that are not possible to be seen in the operating
design domain (ODD)1. Thus we are advocating an alternative
1In training neural networks, the value for each pixel in an image is
commonly re-scaled such that the re-scaled value is in the interval [0, 1].
Starting verification using an input domain of [0, 1]dl0 with dl0 being the
number of input image pixels, the result of formal verification always creates
counter-examples in formal verification where counter-example images are
so distant from what can be observed in practice (such as images without
textures) and are rejected by experts.
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Fig. 1. High-level illustration how to perform safety verification while tackling specification and scalability issues.
assume-guarantee based approach where one first creates an
outer polyhedron by aggregating all visited neuron values
computed by the training set. We use the created polyhedron
as a starting point to perform formal verification, by assuming
that for every possible input data in the ODD, the computed
neuron activation pattern is contained in this polyhedron.
The assumption thus requires to be monitored in runtime
by checking if any computed neuron value falls outside the
polyhedron. As an example, we consider the bound of n171 to
be used in verification in Figure 1. By observing the minimum
and the maximum of all visited values {0, 0.1,−0.1, . . . , 0.6},
[−0.1, 0.6] is an over-approximation over all visited values,
and one shall monitor in runtime whether the computed value
of n171 has fallen outside [−0.1, 0.6].2
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents the required definitions as well as the workflow for
verification. Section III discusses extensions to a statistical
setup when the input property characterizer is not perfect.
Lastly, we summarize related work in Section IV and conclude
with our preliminary evaluation in Section V.
II. VERIFICATION WORKFLOW
A deep neural network is comprised of L layers where
operationally, the l-th layer for l ∈ {1, . . . , L} of the net-
work is a function g(l) : Rdl−1 → Rdl , with dl being the
dimension of layer l. Given an input in ∈ Rd0 , the output
2Note that such a monitoring is needed regardless of formal verification,
as neurons at close-to-output layers represent high-level features, so an
image in operation that leads to unexpectedly high or low neuron feature
intensity (indicated by falling outside the monitored interval) can be hints for
incomplete data collection or indicators for the system stepping out from the
ODD.
of the l-th layer of the neural network f (l) is given by the
functional composition of the l-th layer and the previous layers
f (l)(in) := ◦(l)i=1g(i)(in) = g(l)(g(l−1) . . . g(2)(g(1)(in))).
A. Characterizing Input Specification from Examples
Let Inφ ⊆ Rd0 be the set of inputs of a neural network
that satisfies the property φ. We assume that both φ and Inφ
are unknown (e.g., the road is bending left in an image), but
there exists an oracle (e.g., human) that can answer for a given
input in ∈ Rd0 , whether in ∈ Inφ.
Let (In,Cφ) be the list of training data and their associated
labels (generated by the oracle) related to the input property φ,
where for every (in, c) ∈ (In,Cφ), in ∈ Rd0 , c ∈ {0, 1}, we
have (in, 1) ∈ (In,Cφ) if in ∈ Inφ and (in, 0) ∈ (In,Cφ) if in 6∈
Inφ. The perfect input property characterizer extending the l-th
layer is a function hφl which guarantees that for every (in, c) ∈
(In,Cφ), h
φ
l (f
(l)(in)) = c. The generation of hφl can be done
by training a neural network as a binary classifier, with 100%
success rate on the training data. The following assumption
states that as long as function hφl performs perfectly on the
training data, hφl will also perfectly generalize to the complete
input space. In other words, we can use hφl to characterize φ.
Assumption 1 (Perfect Generalization). Assume that hφl also
perfectly characterizes φ, i.e., ∀in ∈ Rd0 : hφl (f (l)(in)) = 1 iff
in ∈ Inφ.
Definition 1 (Safety Verification). The safety verification
problem asks if there exists an input in ∈ Inφ such that f (L)(in)
satisfies ψ, where the risk condition ψ is a conjunction of
linear inequalities over the output of the neural network. If
no such input in exists, we say that the neural network is safe
under the input constraint φ and the output risk constraint ψ.
When Assumption 1 holds, for safety verification it is
equivalent to ask whether there exists an input in ∈ Rd0 such
that hφl (f
(l)(in)) = 1 and f (L)(in) satisfies ψ. From now on,
unless explicitly specified, we consider only situations where
Assumption 1 holds.
B. Practical Safety Verification
a) Abstraction by omitting neurons before the l-th layer.:
The following result states that one can retain soundness for
safety verification, by considering all possible neuron values
that can appear in the l-th layer.
Lemma 1 (Verification by Layer Abstraction). If there
exists no nˆl ∈ Rdl such that g(L)(g(L−1) . . . (g(l+1)(nˆl))
satisfies ψout and h
φ
l (nˆl) = 1, then the neural network is
safe under input constraint φ and output risk constraint ψ.
Proof. The lemma holds because for every input in ∈ Rd0 of
the network, f (l)(in) ∈ Rdl .
Obviously, the use of Rdl in Lemma 1 is overly conservative,
and we can strengthen Lemma 1 without losing soundness,
if we find S ⊆ Rdl which guarantees that f (l)(in) ∈ S for
every input in ∈ Rd0 of the network. Obtaining such a set S
can be achieved by abstract interpretation techniques [6], [21]
which perform symbolic reasoning over the neural network in
a layer-wise manner.
Lemma 2 (Abstraction via Input Over-approximation). Let
S ⊆ Rdl guarantee that f (l)(in) ∈ S for every input in ∈
Rd0 of the network. If there exists no nˆl ∈ S such that
g(L)(g(L−1) . . . (g(l+1)(nˆl)) satisfies ψout and h
φ
l (nˆl) = 1,
then the neural network is safe under input constraint φ and
output risk constraint ψ.
b) Assume-guarantee Verification via Monitoring.: If the
computed S, due to over-approximation, is too coarse to prove
safety, one practical alternative is to generate S˜ which only
guarantees f (l)(in) ∈ S˜ for every input in ∈ In in the training
data. In other words, S˜ over-approximates the neuron values
computed based on the samples in the training data.
If using S˜ is sufficient to prove safety and if for any input
in, checking whether f (l)(in) ∈ S˜ can be computed efficiently,
one can conditionally accept the proof by designing a run-
time monitor which raises a warning that the assumption
f (l)(in) ∈ S˜ used in the proof is violated. Admittedly, S˜ can
be an under-approximation over {f (l)(in) | in ∈ Rd0}, but
practically creating an over-approximation only based on the
training data is useful and can avoid unstructured input such
as noise which is allowed when using Rd0 .
III. TOWARDS STATISTICAL REASONING
The results in Section II are based on two assumptions of
perfection, namely
• (perfect training) the input property characterizer per-
fectly decides whether property φ holds, for each sample
in the training data, and
in ∈ Inφ in 6∈ Inφ
hφl (f
(l)(in)) = 1 α β
hφl (f
(l)(in)) = 0 γ 1−α− β− γ
TABLE I
PROBABILITY BY CONSIDERING ALL POSSIBLE CASES DUE TO DECISIONS
MADE BY THE INPUT CHARACTERIZER (WHETHER hφl (f
(l)(IN)) = 1)
AND THE GROUND TRUTH (WHETHER IN ∈ INφ).
• (perfect generalization) the input property characterizer
generalizes its decision (whether property φ holds) also
perfectly to every data point in the complete input space.
One important question appears when the above two as-
sumptions do not hold, meaning that it is possible for the
input property characterizer to make mistakes. By considering
all four possibilities in Table I, one realizes that even when
a safety proof is established by considering all inputs where
hφl (f
(l)(in)) = 1, there exists a probability γ where an input in
should be analyzed, but in is omitted in the proof process due
to hφl (f
(l)(in)) being 0 (i.e., in ∈ Inφ and hφl (f (l)(in)) = 0).
Therefore, one can only establish a statistical guarantee with
(1− γ) probability over the correctness claim3, provided that
all data points used in training hφl are also safe
4.
IV. RELATED WORK
Formal verification of neural networks has drawn huge
attention with many results available [13], [8], [3], [5], [9],
[11], [6], [4], [1], [14], [20], [19], [21]. Although specifications
used in formal verification of neural networks are discussed
in recent reviews [7], [15], the specification problem in terms
of characterising an image set is not addressed, so research
results largely use inherent properties of a neural network such
as local robustness (as output invariance) or output ranges
where one does not need to characterize properties over a
set of input images. Not being able to properly characterizing
input conditions (one possibility is to simply consider every
input to be bounded by [−1, 1]) makes it difficult for formal
static analysis to achieve any useful results on deep perception
networks, regardless of the type of abstraction domain being
used (box, octagon, or zonotope). Lastly, our work is motivated
by zero shot learning [12] which trains additional features
apart from a standard neural network. The feature detector is
commonly created by extending the network from close-to-
output layers.
V. EVALUATION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have applied this methodology to examine a direct
perception neural network developed by Audi. The network
acts as a hot standby system and computes the next waypoint
3Note that for parts where in 6∈ Inφ and hφl (f (l)(in)) = 0, no
problem occurs as the safety analysis guarantees the desired property when
hφl (f
(l)(in)) = 1.
4In other words, for every (in, c) ∈ (In,Cφ), if hφl (f (l)(in)) = 0 and
c = 1, then f (L)(in) does not satisfy ψ.
and orientation for autonomous vehicles to follow. As the
close-to-output layers of the network are either ReLU or
Batch Normalization, and as ψ is a conjunction of linear
constraints over output, it is feasible to use exact verification
methods such as ReLUplex [8], Planet [5] or MILP-based
approaches [3], [9] as the underlying verification method. We
developed a variation of nn-dependability-kit5 to read models
from TensorFlow6 and to perform formal verification via a
reduction to MILP. Using assume-guarantee based techniques
that take an over-approximation from neuron values produced
by the training data7, it is possible to conditionally prove some
properties such as “impossibility to suggest steering to the far
left, when the road image is bending to the right”. However,
under the current setup, it is still impossible to prove intriguing
properties such as “impossibility to suggest steering straight,
when the road image is bending to the right”. We suspect that
the main reason is due to the inherent limitation of the neural
network under analysis.
In our experiment, we also found that for some input
properties such as traffic participants in adjacent lanes, it is
very difficult to construct the corresponding input property
characterizers by taking neuron values from close-to-output
layers (i.e., the trained classifier almost acts like fair coin
flipping). Based on the theory of information bottleneck for
neural networks [18], [16], a neural network from high di-
mensional input to low dimensional output naturally eliminates
unrelated information in close-to-output layers. Therefore, the
input property can be unrelated to the output of the network.
Although we are unable to prove that the output of the network
is safe under these input constraints, it should be possible to
construct a counter example either by capturing more data or
by using adversarial perturbation techniques [17], [10].
To achieve meaningful formal verification, in our experi-
ments, we also realized that it is commonly not sufficient to
only record the minimum and maximum value for each neuron,
as boxed abstraction can lead to huge over-approximation. In
certain circumstances, we also record the minimum and max-
imum difference between two adjacent neurons in a layer (in
Figure 1, we record n17i+1−n17i where i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}). Modern
training frameworks such as TensorFlow support computing
differences of adjacent neurons with GPU parallelization8,
thereby making monitoring possible.
Overall, our initial result demonstrates the potential of using
formal methods even on very complex neural networks, while
it provides a clear path to engineers to resolve the problem
related to how to characterize input conditions for verification
(by also applying machine learning techniques). Our approach
of looking at close-to-output layers can be viewed as an
abstraction which can, in future work, leads to layer-wise
5https://github.com/dependable-ai/nn-dependability-kit/
6https://www.tensorflow.org/
7The data is taken from a particular segment of the German A9 highway,
by considering variations such as weather and the current lane.
8Computing the neuron difference, when neuron values are stored in an 1D
tensor n can be done in numpy using a single instruction diff(n), and in
TensorFlow using n[1 :]− n[: −1].
incremental abstraction-refinement techniques. Although our
practical motivation is to verify direct perception networks, the
presented technique is equally applicable to any deep network
for vision and lidar systems where input constraints are hard
to characterize. It opens a new research direction of using
learning to assist practical verification of learning systems.
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